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This thesis explores the relevance and possibilities of an approach
which takes political circumstances explicitly into account in
explaining international trade.
Chapter 1 discusses the need for renewed interest in political
influences that shape the world economic system. Although the merits of
specialization have to be acknowledged, it appears that no substantial
arguments exist for the presently very strict demarcation between
foreign policy and trade theory.
Twentieth century trade theorists in general seem to have completely
banned political variables from their analytic framework. Chapter 2
explores the history of economic thought in order to understand why
politics and economics have been divorced in the study of international
relations. It appears that classical and pre-classical authors as well
as marxist writers paid a lot of attention to the political
consequences and incentives of international economic relations. For
the "founding fathers" of international free trade theory, Smith,
Ricardo and J.S. Mill, political and economic relations were very much
interrelated. The integrated approach, however, has been abandoned in
the twentieth century and two separate sciences have evolved out of
Political Economy. The elimination of political variables from economic
theorizing can be traced back to the works of Marshall, Robbins and
Eucken. An explanation based on the sociology of economics may,
however, also be appropriate, as the professional economist's need for
tribal delineation clearly contributes to pure theoretical analysis
that is unrelated to the real world. Anyhow, recent international trade



























































In Chapter 3 a small trading economy is studied that faces given terms
of trade in combination with an uncertain volume of trade. It is shown
that an increase in the probabílity of trade disruption forces both
public and private decision makers to specialize to a lesser extent in
accordance with their comparative advantage, and hence to restrict the
potential for international trade. Since expectations about future
trading conditions depend to a large extent on the bilateral political
climate, the testable proposition results that an improving
(deteriorating) bilateral diplomatic climate, ceteris pari,bus,
increases (decreases) the bilateral trade flows.
Chapter 4 tests this proposition by means of a cross section gravity
analysis that pertains to the bilateral trade flows of 40 countries in
the year 1985. The empirical results show a significant statistical
relationship between the trade flows and the diplomatic climate. This
relationship was also established on the basis of 40 import and 40
export equations for the individual countries vis-à-vis their 39 trade
partners. It appears that Western market economies adjust their exports
in reaction to diplomatic events) whereas the centrally planned
economies adjust their imports. It can be concluded that the political
variables contribute significantly to the explanation of the world's
trade structure.
The question of the existence of an empirical relationship between
trade flows and the diplomatic climate being answered affirmatively,
Chapter 5 discusses the use of international economic relations as a
means to attain foreign policy goals. A formal model studies an
expected utility maximizer who faces the possibility of a profitable
act of misconduct which is heavily resented by other countries. The
conditions under which positive sanctions (conditional rewards) and
negative sanctions (conditional punishments and threats) influence the
decision unit's behaviour are investigated. Postulating different
shapes of the utility function makes it possible for the analysis to
cover the wide range of decision entities varying from cautious to
risk-loving ones. The willingness of an expected utility maximizing
actor to antagonize the rest of the world can be influenced both by
positive sanctions and negative sanctions, and by measures that enlarge
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the actor's subjective probability that sanctions will be executed upon
misconduct. Enlargement of the (unconditional) yield of neutral
activities induces the risk averter to engage in misconduct, whereas
risk-neutral or risk-loving actors are constrained by such a measure.
Hence in the international arena of politics economic incentives can
only be effective when they are conditional upon the absence of
misconduct.
Our practical experience with economic sanctions as a tool of
international politics is ambivalent. Since opinions pro and corttra the
effectiveness of sanctions are based on biased selections of case
studies, the scientific debate lacks both clarity about how sanctions
work and a solid ernpirical foundation. To alleviate these deficiencies
Chapter 6 presents a review of literature and some empirical findings.
A logit analysis based on the data of a recent study by Hufbauer and
Schott correctly predicts failure and success in 83% out of 80
sanctions in the years 1946-1983. The probability that an economic
sanction succeeds is higher the larger the pre-sanction trade linkage,
the more unstable the target's political situation and the shorter the
sanction period. Concerning the sanctioner's reputation as an
executioner of threats, it was found that the positive marginal
influence of the number of prior threats diminishes and even turns
negative after a certain number.
Hence based on both theoretical and empirical analysis it has to be
concluded that a negative economic sanction can be an effective
instrument of foreign policy, provided that certain conditions are met.
This finding in itself offers indirect support for traditional trade
theory, as a negative economic sanction implies a (potential) welfare
loss and hence constitutes a strong incentive to adapt behaviour.
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